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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff and Respondent

t

vs.
)
LA,VRENCE R. SEYl\IOUR,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10596

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant, Lawrence R. Seymour, appeals
from his conviction upon jury trial in the District Court
of the Third Judicial District for the crime of attempting to obtain money by false pretenses in violation of
Section 76-1-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
The appellant was charged by complaint with the
crime of attempting to obtain money by false pretenses.
After several continuances, he appeared before the City
I

Court of Salt Lake City without counsel and waived
preliminary hearing, after which he was bound over to
district court. At the time of his appearance in the
district court, he was represented by counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty, whereupon a full trial was held on the
charge and the appellant was found guilty.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the conviction should
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits that the facts are ade·
quately set forth in the appellant's brief. However,
respondent would like to call to the court's attention
the fact that no motion was apparently made at the time
of the appellant's arraignment in district court to remand the case to the city court for the purposes of a
preliminary hearing. Further, counsel for the appellant
in no way indicated that he was prejudiced or unprepared because of a failure to have a preliminary hearing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO QUASH THE INFORMATION AND
2

THE MOTION FOR NE'V TRIAL ON THE
GROUNDS THAT THE APPELLANT WAS
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AT
THE TIME OF PRELIMINARY HEARING,
SINCE A PRELIMINARY HEARING IS
NOT A CRITICAL STAGE REQUIRING
THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, AND
THE RECORD APPEARS TO SUBSTANTIATE THAT THE APPELLANT 'VAIVED
PRELIMINARY HEARING.
The only issue raised on appeal by the appellant
is whether a preliminary hearing is a critical stage that
requires the appointment of counsel. It appears from
the transcript of proceedings in the city court that the
appellant appeared in the City Court of Salt Lake
City on December 3, 1965, and did waive preliminary
hearing (R. 3). If the affidavit of Mr. Hisatake is to
be believed, he was not present, and the transcript
indicates that he was not present, since it states that the
appellant was present without counsel. Consequently,
the only question is whether there is an absolute requirement to counsel at the time of preliminary hearing. If
there is no such absolute requirement, then the trial court
was correct in denying the motion to quash the information. Respondent further contends that the trial court
acted in accordance with law in denying the motion for
a new trial since it was not timely filed.
Section 77-38-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, proYides that a motion for new trial must be served and
3

filed within five days after the rendition of the verdict
or decision. The decision in the instant case was rendered
on November 5, 1965, and the motion for new trial was
not filed until November 15, 1965. Consequently, the
only question is whether the trial court erred in not
granting the motion to quash the information on the
grounds of a lack of preliminary hearing. Since the
transcript indicates that preliminary hearing was waived,
there is no evidence to contradict the fact that a prelimi·
nary hearing was offered to the appellant and he did,
in fact, waive it. Further, no motion to remand for a
preliminary hearing was made. The only question, there·
fore, is whether appellant had a constitutional right to
have counsel appointed, although he apparently waived
preliminary hearing.
Appellant has framed as the sole issue in his brief
on appeal the question of whether under recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court a preliminary
hearing is such a critical stage as to require the appoint·
ment of counsel. The appellant points to three decisions
from the United States Supreme Court to justify his
position.
The first is Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
This case merely laid down the rule that in a capital
case a state must provide counsel for an indigent defend·
ant. Nowhere in the Powell case did the court rule that
counsel was essential at a preliminary hearing.
In the second case cited by the appellant, Hamilton
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 ( 1961), the United States
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Supreme Court held that under Alabama procedure
the arraignment was a "critical stage" which required
the appointment of counsel. That case is substantially
different from the instant case, since the appellant does
not contend that he was denied counsel at the time of
his arraignment but at the time of preliminary hearing.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that under Alabama
procedure, if a defense of insanity or various special
motions were to be brought to the court's attention,
that they would have to have been plead at the time
of arraignment or thereafter lost. There is no requirement that a defendant enter any plea or raise any
defense at the time of preliminary hearing under Utah
procedure upon penalty that if he fails to do so he will
be foreclosed from raising the defense. The Hamilton
case in no way considered the question of necessity of
counsel at preliminary hearing.
Finally, the appellant cites the case of White v.
ill aryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963). In this case, the defendant contended that the failure to give him counsel at
the time of preliminary hearing was a violation of his
constitutional rights. The argument was based upon the
fact that at the time of preliminary hearing under Maryland procedure, the defendant entered a plea of guilty.
Thereafter, before the dictrict court, after being bound
over, he entered a plea of not guilty. At the time of his
trial, his plea of guilty at the time of preliminary hearing could be used against him as an admission against
his interest which resulted in his conviction. The United
States Supreme Court ruled that since at the time of
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preliminary hearing, a plea could be entered which could
later be used against the defendant at the time of trial,
the preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" requiring
the appointment of counsel. This case is, of course, substantially different than the issue now before the court.
Under Utah procedure, no plea is entered at the time
of preliminary hearing. In the instant case, there is no
evidence that anything was said at the time of the
appearance before Judge Beck where the appellant
waived preliminary hearing that was used against him
at the time of trial. Consequently, the decision in White
v. Maryland, supra, is not material to the present fact
situation. Further, in the present fact situation, there
was no motion to remand the case for additional pre·
liminary hearing nor any showing that the absence of
a preliminary hearing in any way prejudiced the appel·
lant's position. In addition, appellant here was afforded
a full trial on his plea of not guilty, was represented by
counsel, and convicted only upon the evidence offered to
the jury.
The same issue raised in this case which was before
the court in State v. Bransch, 119 Utah 550, 229 P.2d
289 ( 1951 ) . In that case, this court noted that:
"The preliminary hearing is an inquiry, not
a trial. It is held in the place of the common law
grand jury where the accused is only present if
called as a witness and is never represented by
counsel."
The court in the Braasch case further noted that at the
preliminary hearing there was no prejudice to the de·
6

fendant from the failure to have counsel. This court
determined that there could be no prejudice to the
defendants where they had a full trial subsequent to
appearing at preliminary hearing without counsel. There
is no reason to depart from the Braasch rule.
Recently, courts have generally recognized that a
preliminary hearing is not a critical stage within the
meaning of Hamilton and White.
In DeToro v. Peppersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir.
1964), a state prisoner sought a petition of writ of
habeas corpus from a federal court. The matter came
before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court
ruled that under Maryland law, as modified since the
'Vhite decision, that a preliminary hearing was not a
critical stage of judicial process and that defenses not
raised were not irretrievably lost. Therefore, the failure
to appoint counsel for the accused charged with murder
did not violate his constitutional right to counsel. The
court stated:
"Despite the very able arguments advanced by
counsel for DeToro, we are unable to accept
either of these contentions. 'Ve take as our starting point, as do the parties, Powell v. Alabama,
supra, which states the broad proposition that an
accused has the right to counsel 'at every step in
the proceedings against him.' 287 U.S. at 69,
53 S.Ct. at 64. In Powell, this was taken to mean
that the accused has the right to have counsel
appointed sufficiently in advance of trial to
make adequate preparation. Later decisions of
the Court have reaffirmed the importance of pre-
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trial preparation. In Avery v. Alabama, 308
U.S. 444, Mr. Justice Black warned that:
'[T]he denial of opportunity for appointed
counsel to confer, to consult with the accused
and to prepare his defense, could convert the
appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a formal compliance with the
Constitution's requirement that an accused be
given the assistance of counsel. The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment.'

While Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, and
White v. Maryland, supra, have further extended the right to counsel prior to trial, we are
unable to read them as extending that right to
the extent and in the manner urged by DeToro.
In Hamilton, the defendant, indicted for burg- '
lary, and without counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty at arraignment. The Supreme Court reversed his later conviction, holding that the defendant had been entitled to counsel, since, under
Alabama law, arraignment is 'a critical stage in
a criminal proceeding.' 368 U.S. at 53, 82 S.Ct.
at 158. It was a critical stage, according to the
Court, because certain defenses, specifically a
plea of insanity, a plea in abatement, and a
motion to quash based on an improperly drawn
grand jury, not raised at arraignment, were considered waived.
In White, the accused was without counsel at
a preliminary hearing. Unlike arraignment under
Alabama law, a preliminary hearing under Maryland law is not, in and of itself, a critical stage
in the judicial process. Defenses not raised at a
preliminary hearing are not irretrievably lost
and may be raised later. In the context of the
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particular facts of White, however, the Court
was persuaded that White's preliminary hearing
had been a critical stage. This was so because
White's plea of guilty, taken at the preliminary
hearing and subsequently withdrawn, was introduced into evidence against him during trial. On
this ground, the Court reversed the conviction.
DeToro calls our attention to what he considers to be the key sentence of the case:
'For petitioner entered a plea before the
magistrate and that plea was taken at a time
when he had no counsel.' 373 U.S. at 60, 83
S.Ct. 1051.
The district court, we think, effectively brought
the above sentence into the proper perspective:
'This sentence cannot be read out of context.
It must relate to the case before the Court,
namely that the "plea" was "guilty," and it
was offered in evidence at the trial.' 222 F.
Supp. at 624.
In our view, Hamilton and White teach that
an accused is denied rights afforded him under
the sixth amendment when he is subjected to an
arraignment or to a preliminary hearing without
the assistance of counsel, where events transpire
that are likely to prejudice his ensuing trial. The
court, in each case, refused to speculate as to
whether in fact prejudice actually accrued.
Thus, the thrust of Powell's admonition that
an accused has a right to counsel 'at every step in
the proceedings against him,' as borne out by
subsequent decisions, including Hamilton and
White, seems to be that if the effectiveness of
legal assistance ultimately furnished an accused
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is likely to be prejudiced by its prior denial, the
earlier period may be deemed a critical stage in
the judicial process and a conviction obtained in
such circumstances is rendered invalid. We find
nothing in the Supreme Court decisions, however,
that would permit us to extend the duty of the
State to appoint counsel in proceedings where
even the likelihood of later prejudice arising from
the failure to appoint is absent."
It should be noted that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Latham v. Crause,
320 F.2d 120 (1963), handed down subsequent to both
\Vhite and Hamilton, ruled that an accused has no constitutional right to be furnished counsel at a preliminary
hearing in a state court capital case. In that case, two
individuals by the names of Latham and York were
responsible for a series of killings throughout the United
States, and were tried and convicted of murder in
Kansas after being apprehended in Utah. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on its previous decision
in Utah v. Sullivan, 227 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1952). It
stated:

"The first contention is that petitioners were
entitled to have counsel appointed for them prior
to the preliminary examination. l-Ieavy reliance
is placed on the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainright, Corrections Director, 372 U.S. 385, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9
L.Ed. 2d 799. That case concerned the right of
an accused to counsel at trial - not a preliminary
hearing. In State of Utah v. Sullivan, 10 Cir.,
227 F.2d 511, 513, certiorari denied, sub nom.
Braasch v. Utah, 350 U.S. 973, 76 S.Ct. 449,
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100 L.Ed. 844, we held that in circumstances
where an accused did not enter a plea of guilty
at a preliminary hearing, did not make a confession, did not testify and did not say anything
of an incriminating nature, the failure to furnish
counsel at such hearing did not abridge the accused's fundamental constitutional rights. That
decision is controlling here. No claim is made of
any incriminating statements or acts of nation.
All they did was to waive the right to a preliminary hearing. Prejudice is asserted on the ground
that counsel would have forced the prosecution
to disclose at least some of its evidence. The point
is not well taken as more than a month in advance
of trial copies of the confessions and lists of the
prosecution witnesses were given defense counsel.
Our conclusions in State of Utah v. Sullivan are
supported _by the decisions of other circuits. We
find nothing in Gideon v. Wainright which requires a review of the decision in State of Utah
v. Sullivan."
Further, most recently, in Loato v. Cux, 344 F.2d
916 (10th Cir. 1965), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion adhered to the position
noted above. The court observed that the preliminary
proceedings were entirely independent of the prisoner's
formal arraignment and sentencing, and at the time
of preliminary hearing, the prisoner was not prejudiced.
In the Loato case, the defendant appeared before a
justice of the peace without counsel and thereafter, at
the time of arraignment, entered a plea of guilty. The
court concluded that the defendant was m no way
deprived of any constitutional right.
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A similar case is United States v. Rundle, 349 F.2d
952 (3rd Cir. 1965).
In Vol. II, No. 4, of the Def ender News Letter
'
July 6, 1965, there is an excellent discussion of the right
to counsel at preliminary hearing. It is noted:
"Some courts have understood the White case
to mean that the absence of counsel at the preliminary hearing is not a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, if the absence of counsel is not, in the eyes of the court, prejudicial."
Thus, in People v. Daniels, 199 N.E.2d 33
(Ill. App. 1964), an Illinois appellate court saw
~o deprivation of the accused's right to counsel,
since:
'there is neither a claim or any showing that
the absence of counsel at the preliminary hear·
ing or a failure of an earlier appointment of
counsel in any manner prejudiced the defend·
ant or in any way adversely affected or con·
taminated the subsequent proceedings in the
case'."
The same newsletter notes:
"Other courts have found there to be no con·
stitutional injury in the failure to appoint coun·
sel where no plea offered at the preliminary hear·
ing could be offered in evidence at the trial***."
In United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reineke, 333
F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1964), a United States Court of
Appeals reasoned that the preliminary hearing in Con·
necticut could not be deemed a critical stage. The court
stated:
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"The Connecticut hearing in probable cause
has been accurately characterized as a mere 'inquest' made to determine the existence of probable cause, and to discharge the accused if none
exist ***. The finding of probable cause is not
final and it cannot be used against the accused
on trial before the superior court. ***
The Connecticut hearing in probable cause
cannot, therefore, be characterized as critical as
in the arraignment in Alabama. Indeed, it can
hardly be termed a proceeding against the accused. To the contrary, it appears to operate
entirely for the accused's benefit. And the mere
fact that an accused is required to plead does not,
in itself, demand the contrary conclusion where
the plea entered is a self-serving denial of guilt.
At trial, appellant had every opportunity to
present any events that was available initially."
Further, in Freeman v. State, 392 P.2d 542 (Ida.
1964), the Supreme Court of Idaho stated:
"While it is recognized that an accused has a
right to counsel at every s).:age of the proceedings,
we do not understand this to mean that he must
be so represented in the preliminary processes
which take place primarily for the purpose of
ascertaining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the accused has committed it, and
particularly, where no prejudice has befallen
him."
Numerous decisions from other courts from other
states support the proposition urged in this brief.
Thus, in Montgornery v. State, 176 So.2d 331 (Fla.
1965 ) , the court ruled that a preliminary hearing was
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not a critical stage in Florida. Defendant had not been
informed of his right to counsel at arraignment before
the magistrate on preliminary hearing.
In State v. Cox, 193 Kan. 571, 396 P.2d 326 ( 1964),
the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the lack of rep·
resentation by counsel at the time of preliminary hearing did not violate the constitutional rights of the defendant who did not request appointment and made no
claim that there was any particular prejudice at the
time of his trial from the failure to have counsel at the
time of preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court of
Kansas cited the Tenth Circuit case in Latham v.
Crause, supra, and indicated that the purpose of a pre·
liminary hearing in Kansas was comparable to that in
Utah in that it was an inquiry to determine probable
cause and nothing more.
A similar result was reached by the New Mexico
Supreme Court in French v. Cox, 74 N.M. 593, 396
P.2d 423 (1964).
In State v. Jackson, 400 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1964),
the Washington Supreme Court indicated that the right
to counsel extends only to critical stages in the judicial
process and that the critical point is to be determined
both from the nature of the proceeding and from what
actually occurs. The court there found that the prelimi·
nary hearing was not a trial in the sense that one could
be found guilty, but was a mere inquest made to de·
termine the existence of probable cause; and that since
nothing that occurred at the preliminary hearing could
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be used against the defendant, it was not a critical stage
which would warrant the appointment of counsel. The
court carefully distinguished the Hamilton and White
cases on the same basis that other cases heretofore cited
and discussed have distinguished their application.
A similar result was reached again by the Kansas
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Blacksmith, 194
Kan. 643, 400 P .2d 743 ( 1965) . In that case, the court
further held [referring to a previous Kansas case]:
"That any so-called alleged 'irregularity' pertaining to a preliminary examination is deemed
to be waived where a defendant enters a voluntary
plea of guilty in the district court."
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Schumacher, 97 Ariz. 354, 400 P .2d 584 ( 1965) , also reached
the same conclusions as the New Mexico and Kansas
courts. Further, the Arizona court relied upon the decision of the Nevada Supreme Court in Application of
Hoff, 393 P.2d 619 (Nev. 1964). Thus, almost every
state surrounding Utah has adopted the position that
this court recognized in the case of State v. Braasch,
supra.
In Poris v. State, 195 Kan. 313, 403 P.2d 959
(1965), the Kansas Supreme Court ruled again that
an indigent defendant has no constitutional right to be
furnished court-appointed counsel at his preliminary
hearing.
A similar result was reached in the decision of
State v. Atkins, 195 Kan. 182, 403 P.2d 962 (1965).
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The appellant cites the decision of the PennsyJ.
vania Supreme Court in Butler v. Rundle, 206 A.2d
283 (Penn. 1965) . This decision does not support the
appellant's position. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded that a preliminary hearing was not a critical
stage requiring the appointment of counsel for an in·
digent defendant. The quotation in the appellant's brief
is not from the majority opinion. Pennsylvania also
reached the same result in James v. Russell, 207 A.2d
792 (Pa. 1965).
The Ohio Court in Bussey v. Maxwell, 202 N.E.
2d 698 (Ohio 1964), ruled that a preliminary hearing
was not a critical stage where its only purpose was in
determining whether the defendant should be held for
arraignment in the court of general jurisdiction. The
Ohio court has most recently reached the same result in
Tabor v. Maxwell, 209 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1965).
Thus, the overwhelming majority of states have
reached the conclusion that a preliminary hearing under
the procedure comparable to that existing in Utah is
not a critical stage, warranting the appointment of
counsel. See The Preliminary Hearing - An I nteresl
Analysis, 51 Iowa L.Rev. 164, p. 169 (1965). All the
states surrounding the State of Utah have apparently
reached the same conclusion. The position urged by the
appellant is not only contrary to previous Utah prece·
dent, but is contrary to the great majority of states and
is a distinct minority position. It may be that under
particular fact situations, it could be said that the failure
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to provide counsel at preliminary hearing would be a
denial of a constitutional right, but in the instant case
there is no showing that any adverse statement was made
by the appellant or that he was in any particular prejudice. Although the appellant argues that prejudice
need not necessarily be shown in a case involving a
violation of constitutional rights, this statement is an
overly broad conclusion, since the United States Supreme Court has noted that in certain cases, the question
of prejudice determines whether a critical stage has
been reached.
The appellant's reliance upon the recent decisions
in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and MMsiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), is misplaced.
Both of these cases involve situations where in the absence of counsel, confessions were obtained. This is not
the case in the instant situation. The preliminary hearing resulted in absolutely no prejudice to the defendant.
The respondent is aware of no case in which the United
States Supreme Court has held that the failure to have
counsel at the time of an interrogation where no confession or any admission is obtained against the interest
of a defendant violates his constitutional rights and
results in a vitiation of the conviction. Further, both of
these cases are directed to the discouragement of particular abusive police practices, which is not the situation
in the instant case.

It therefore is respectfully submitted that the trial

court acted properly in ruling that preliminary hearing
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was not a critical stage and that the defendant could
waive the right to counsel and that the absence of counsel would not result in a vitiation of his conviction.

CONCLUSION
The issue in the instant case seems to be one that
has been decided by the overwhelming majority of states
adverse to the position urged by the appellant on appeal.
It is respectfully submitted that this court should adhere
to its position in State v. Braasch, supra, and rule that
the failure to provide counsel at the time of appellant's
preliminary hearing, especially where there is an indi·
ca ti on of waiver in the record and nothing to rebut it,
did not result in any violation of any constitutional right.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN

Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE

Asst. Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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